Abstract-In the secret sharing schemes already published, the security of the scheme is mostly established upon difficult mathematical problems such as the solution of discrete logarithm and the factoring of large number. However, such schemes take up lots of resources while result in low speed. In this paper we propose a new secret-sharing scheme, which is based on shamir secret sharing scheme and use the NTRU and one-way hashing function to verify the validity of data. The security of our scheme is built on quick and efficient NTRU algorithm. It can use the public channel to issue information, detect effectively a variety of cheating or forgery behaviors, and ensure the credibility of resumption of secret.
INTRODUCTION
How to keep secret information is an important research subject for a nation in its military, political or commercial activities. If the task of secret keeping is given to one member only, we run a great risk of either losing the secret information or having it tampered. To enhance the safety of secret information, in 1979 cryptographists Shamir (ref. 1) and Blakley (ref. 2) posited their (t，n) threshold secret sharing schemes based respectively on Lagrange difference polynomial and Finite geometries theory. The fundamental idea behind the Shamir scheme is to separate one piece of secret information or one cryptographic key into n different sub-secrets and then distribute them to n different members to keep. And of the n members, at least t must cooperate in order to restore the secret information, that is, less than t members are unable restore the separated information. The Shamir scheme is easy and practicable, and therefore it becomes the highlight in the field of cryptology.
Since the secret sharing technique come into being, research on it has attracted wide attention because it could prevent secret information from getting lost or damaged, and thus increase the safety of the secret and decrease the success rate of the attackers. In ref. 3 , based on (t，n) threshold, Harn firstly put forward a secret sharing scheme that makes possible authentication, through which we could reveal the cheating behaviors of both the administrator and the members. But Harn's scheme has the weakness of relying on the execution of an interactive authentication protocol. Out of the other schemes later, that of Chen (ref. 4 ) overcomes the weakness of Harn's scheme, but needs huge amount of calculation instead. After that, Shi and some others designed the Multisecret Sharing Schemes based on schemes of Harn and Chen but conquered some of their weak points. Fei (ref. 6) used a secret administrator and RSA digital signature to authenticate each of the sub-secrets, but the scheme is still flawed in preventing cheating behaviors. And Wang (ref. 7) pointed out some deficiencies of Shi's scheme in cheating prevention and in its design and gave resolutions to those deficiencies. Then in ref. 8 and ref. 9 , the improved secret sharing scheme is given, focusing on reusing the sub-secrets of the members and extending them. However, all the schemes above achieve their safety by using the traditional discrete logarithm or the factoring of large number.
NTRU (Number Theory Research Unit) algorithm is a public-key cryptography invented in 1996 by three professors of mathematics in Brown University in America. Compared to other public-key cryptographies NTRU has many advantages. In safety, NTRU could resist the attack of quantum calculation while RAS and ECC couldn't. In speed of the algorithm and demand for the memory, NTRU institutions declared that the speed of NTRU algorithm is 2000 times that of other publickey algorithms used for the safety of wireless communication, while it takes up only 1/50 the space of memory needed by the others. And in standardization, NTRU algorithm has officially become the IEEE P1363 standard, and has been accepted by institutions of CEES、IEEE 802.15.3 and so on.
In this paper, ground on Shamir's threshold scheme using Lagrange difference polynomial, we give a (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme using NTRU public-key algorithm, whose safety therefore relies on that of NTRU algorithm. The uniqueness of our scheme lies in the following respects: it builds its safety on NTRU algorithm that is fast and efficient, not on traditional discrete logarithm or the factoring of large number; it allows the channels between secret administrator and members and those between one member and another to become public, with no need to establish special safety channels and in this way weakening its reliance on execution environment; it resists effectively the cheating behaviors among members and attacks of all kinds; and it prevents successfully any hostile decoding or tampering of the attackers.
II. SECRET SHARING SCHEME BASED ON NTRU First, confirm that you have the correct template for your paper size. This template has been tailored for output on the A4 paper size. If you are using US letter-sized paper, please close this file and download the file for "MSW US ltr format". P: the assembly of all members in a threshold secret sharing scheme. When there're n members in a scheme, P={P 1 ，P 2 ， …，P n }.
sk: the secret information or the cryptographic key needed to protect in a scheme. As to NTRU algorithm,
. Or we can use the form of a vector: sk [10, 11] .
D: the secret administrator in a scheme, and D∉P. The main responsibility of D is to distribute every sub-secret to every P i (i=1，2，…，n), and to provide every member with the public parameters needed to restore sk.
NB: electronic bulletin tablet. D could publish, change, add and delete information on NB. But what other members in the scheme could do is only checking and reading information on NB, but no editorial activity such as changing the information.
N: the highest power in polynomials used in NTRU, usually as a prime number.
q: the maximum modulus in NTRU, usually as a positive integer depending on specific examples.
p: the minimum modulus in NTRU, usually as a small positive integer or a polynomials of low powers.
F, f, g: polynomials engendering cryptographic key in NTRU.
r: blinding value polynomial in NTRU for encryption. H: one-way hashing function used in the scheme, either MD5 or SHA..
Initiation of The Scheme
Secret administrator D constitutes parameters (N，p，q，d F ，d r ，d g ) of NTRU, and assign a couple of cryptographic keys (h i ，f i ) to each member P i ( i=1，2，…，n) of the scheme. 
in which i=1，2，…，n
Secretly D assigns each f i to every P i of the scheme, and requires P i to keep f i as a secret.
D publishes (N，p，q，h i ) on the electronic bulletin tablet NB.
Calculating The Sub-secrets
As secret administrator D distributes sub-secrets of sk to the n members P i (i=1，2，…，n) in the scheme, D is doing the following things:
, and express them in vectors. This way we constitute a secret polynomial b(x) with the power (t-1).
in the limited range of GF(q), D chooses n different integers x i, and calculates:
Calculating The Fraud Authentication Value
According to the value of d r ,D chooses polynomial r randomly, and calculates:
in which H is one-way hashing function, and V i is to avoid fraud authentication. D could publish ( ' i sk ，V i ) to P i, and at the same time publish (x i ，V i ) on the electronic bulletin tablet.
Checking Cheating Behaviors
When it is needed to restore the shared secret sk, each member could use the formulas below:
Theorem: members could use formula (8) to check whether the couple of (sk i ，V i ) is correct, and when it is not, there exist cheating behaviors or forgery.
To prove it:
f i * V i (mod q ) (mod p ) = f i *( r *h i +H(sk i ))(mod q )(mod p ) = f i *( r *q* f iq *g +H(sk i ))(mod q )(mod p ) = f i *H(sk i )(mod q )(mod p ) =(1+p*F i ) * H(sk i )(mod q )(mod p ) = H(sk i )
Indications of Parameters 2.6 Restoring The Shared Secret
In the process of restoring the shared secret, when t random members in the scheme P i1 ，P i2 ，…，P it want to restore the shared secret sk, constituted is one only polynomial b(x) with the power of t-1 that go through point of (x i1 ，sk i1 )，(x i2 ， sk i2 ) ，…，(x it ， sk it ), and sk could be calculated with the Lagrange Interpolation Formula:
mod q (9) to members who participate in the secret-restoring process, j, k are their serial numbers in the assembly of all participating members, and i is their serial number in the assembly of all members in the threshold scheme. We could use values of i, j to get value of x ij.
III. THE SAFETY OF THE SCHEME
The safety of this scheme is bases on the mathematical problem of seeking the shortest vector in lattice, which is extremely difficult to do. So considering the huge amount of calculation, it is not applicable to get the secret information directly from the public information.
Administrator use formulas (3) and (4) to calculate subsecrets for the members, and if the coefficients of b(x) are not leaked, sub-secrets of the members are not leaked as well. If attackers want to deduce sub-secrets sk i from public information, they need to know both b(x) and f i . Because the safety of the scheme is bases upon the irreversibility of NTRU Algorithm and one-way hashing function, to calculate sk i is not possible.
The Safety of Public Channel
In the threshold secret sharing scheme already published, it is required that the channel between administrator and a member and those between different members are all safe, which is hard to achieve in common practice. In this scheme, before sk i is delivered it must be encrypted, so the demand on the safety of channel between administrator and a member and those between different members is low and channel could become public. Even if attackers in the channel get t different subsecrets ' i sk ,they still could not restore sk i . During communications among members f i is not delivered, so attackers do not know f i and consequently could not know sk i. To get sk i from attacking the channel, attackers have two approaches: one is to decipher t couples of NTRU cryptographic keys according to h i on the electronic bulletin tablet, which is almost impossible; another is that at least t members of the scheme voluntarily leak their private secrets f i to attackers at the same time, which is also of little possibility. Since administrator in the scheme would assign a couple of cryptographic keys to every member, it is easier to discover which member is leaking secret.
Checking Cheating Behaviors among Members
To a member P i in the scheme, if formula (8) exists, then the sk i provided by P i is effective, or P i could be an internal or external cheater.
In the (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme based on NTRU and designed to prevent cheating behaviors among members, the success rate of any cheating behavior among members equates with the success rate of decrypting NTRU algorithm. If member is P i a cheater, who must change sk i to * i sk , and calculate:
V =V i is hard to achieve, so the member could not satisfy formula (8) unless he has successfully decrypted oneway hashing function and NTRU algorithm.
Collusive Attacks of Members
If two members in the scheme P i and P j try to attack the restoring of shared secret sk collusively, they might exchange their sk i and sk j, , that is, P i would have sk j while P j would have sk i. But because the public secret of each member has been published in the Electronic Bulletin Tablet already, information on which could not be changed by a member, still sk j provided by P i or sk i provided by P j could not satisfy formula (8) , and other members could easily discover the collusion of P i and P j.
Cheating Behavior of The Administrator
Till now in lots of related papers, authors have devoted great effort studying how to prevent cheating behaviors of the administrator, and the main achievement is to identify with zero-knowledge proof, demanding the administrator to provide coefficients of polynomial b(x) and the promise of assigning sub-secrets sk i to members, and in the scheme the method to identify whether the administrator has assigned a fraudulent sub-secret is added. We think that such consideration is prudent to an unnecessary level. To cheat members, the administrator has various ways, such as assigning fraudulent sub-secrets, forging public parameters on the Electronic Bulletin Tablet, deliberately designing bugs and so on. Besides, if in it even the administrator is dishonest, such a scheme has no value to exist. And for this reason the focus of our research should be on how to prevent information released by the administrator to get tampered or deleted by attackers and how to enhance the safety and secrecy of the channel way between the administrator and the members.
In this scheme we encrypt information released by the administrator to make tampering of sk i impossible. And even if sk i provided by the administrator is forged, we still could detect it with the above method.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nowadays in most of the secret sharing schemes already published, the safety of the scheme is based on difficult mathematical problems of solving discrete logarithm or the factoring of large number, with which it is comparatively easy to constitute a secret sharing scheme. But the safety of such kind of schemes is facing great challenges as the function of computers advances in an amazing speed. At the same time, such schemes rely on power multiplication, and therefore take great amount of time calculating and need huge memory space. The advantages of NTRU algorithm are its fast speed, little resource taken up and enhanced safety. So to use NTRU instead of discrete logarithm and the factoring of large number as foundation for the threshold scheme has become a brand new research focus in developing new secret sharing schemes. In the future we would explore multisecret sharing schemes based on the scheme we introduced here.
